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ABSTRACT 
  In 1992, Canada, Mexico and the U.S. entered into the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) whose goal was to increase trade in North America by uniting the three 
nations in a free trade zone.  Through the reduction of tariffs, trade among the three countries has 
significantly increased in the last 17 years.  However, a truly free market eludes the continent.  
Incongruent regulations have created technical barriers to trade for businesses trying to operate 
across borders.  The regulation of food labels is a good example of this problem. America, 
Canada, and Mexico have three different and incompatible systems for regulating food, and any 
cross-border vendor must treble their allotted time, effort, and cost to ensure compliance.   
  Any attempts to change this situation, however, will require more than a mere summit of 
the regulators from each country.  While each country has a tripartite government creating 
statutes that are then administered by administrative agencies, the influences on policy making 
and procedures for changing regulation in each country actually vary widely.  Though the 
countries may all benefit from harmonization of regulations, the countries will have to overcome 
cultural, historical and political obstacles to create beneficial economic policies.   
  The challenges are many, but not overwhelming.  For one, harmonization of regulation is 
but one step in a process.  There is no reason for the three countries to feel their differences are 
insurmountable.  Only 50 years ago, Europe faced much deeper and older intra-continental hang-
ups, but now Europe is as close to a continental free market as the world has known.   If Europe 
can overcome their problems, so can North America.  Both creative and practical solutions may 
be needed, but harmonization is possible.  1 
 
I: INTRODUCTION 
What is a food label?  It seems a simple question.  We all know what labels do: they 
identify a product.   
Or is it that they describe a product?  Do they warn about a product?  All of the above?  
Dictionary.com provides twelve definitions on a cursory search for the word "label."  All of them 
relate to some sort of identification, but none are particular to food. 
  The precise definition of the term "label" seems unimportant in a supermarket aisle.  A 
label is a label is a label.  When we walk into a supermarket, we see labels stacked one upon 
another, all of which providing about as much information as we can process, most of which 
providing much more information than we actually do process.  We have no need to deeply 
investigate labels because at first glance there are few variations between products: a product 
name, a picture, maybe some special characteristic, and the nutritional information on the back 
of the package.   
The information provided upon labels may, to most consumers, appear sufficient yet 
arbitrary.  Still, they are indisputably necessary.   People use labels to identify and distinguish 
products.   Through experience, labels take on a meaning relative to one another.  "Creamy," 
means something different from "Low Fat," which means something different from, "Fat Free."   
We compare one label to another, decide which identifier fits our wishes, and toss the product 
into the cart.   
  The same experience that allows us to purchase products based wholly on their labels 
also tells us that we need not worry about veracity or safety when reading labels.  One of the 
luxuries of living in the world's richest country is that our food labels are anything but 2 
 
"arbitrary."  Indeed, they are battled over, negotiated, monitored and thoroughly intentional.  
Every producer hoping to sell their wares at the market knows that their first chance at making a 
sale is how they label their food: "Do my customers want jelly, preserves, marmalade or jam?"  
With such pressure on what the label says (on the name of food, on the claims made about the 
food and the nutritional information), regulation is necessary.  Without exacting oversight, 
producers might be tempted to tell lies to suit what consumers want to hear, instead of telling 
them the truth about the product.   
  Enter the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).  As the most competent, thorough, 
respected regulator of foods in the world,
1 FDA and its predecessor agencies have policed 
America's food supply for over a century.  Whatever one might say about the American diet, 
being tricked, misinformed or otherwise ill-served by the labels on our food is not Americans' 
problem.  Unless one asks the Canadians.  Or the Mexicans.  Or, come to mention it, most other 
countries around the world.   
  As it turns out, FDA's food regulations are not a pure function of ingredients, nutritional 
information, and concern for the common welfare.  Like any regulations, they are the result of 
political horse trading.  Interested parties compete with one another for influence among 
lawmakers.  Lawmakers weigh the value of various facts, interests and concerns.   After lengthy 
discussions and compromises, regulations are promulgated, labels stuck on food products, and 
Americans sleep easily about their food supply.
2   
                                                 
1 Katharine E. Gourlie, NAFTA Countries: Convergence and Fracture, 51 FOODDLJ 423,  425 (1996). 
2 This abbreviated summary of the regulatory process is not to imply anything sinister in the politics of food 
regulation.  "Interested parties" are merely any groups or individuals with a comment to add to the legislative 
dialogue.  Rather, the point is to highlight that governmental food regulation does not happen in an apolitical 
vacuum. 3 
 
  It should surprise no one then, that what American lawmakers decide upon as the optimal 
balance of interests and concerns might not be identical to what Canada and Mexico have settled 
upon as the optimal balance of interests and concerns.  After all, Canada and Mexico have 
democratically elected governments and competent regulators and civil servants, along with 
sophisticated lobbying and campaigning cultures.  While food safety may be a scientific 
undertaking, the legislative process is as scientific as alchemy.   
  The lack of consensus would trouble no one in a world where food was a strictly intra-
national product.  However, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
3 General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and most economic theory of the last 20 years has 
caused food, like t-shirts and widgets, to be traded without regard to national boundary.  In light 
of the international nature of the food trade, discordant regulation of food products brings 
economic harm to both producers and consumers of each country.  The harmonization of food 
regulations is an issue which must be addressed to fully benefit both consumers and producers in 
a free-trade world.
4 
This paper aims to explore the topic of disharmonized food regulations between the 
United States, Mexico, and Canada.  I will specifically focus upon the discordant regulation of 
food labels.  This segment of the trans-continental trade is an illustration of the current regulatory 
situation among the NAFTA Parties. 
                                                 
3 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 289, Art. 904 (4) (1993). (Hereinafter 
"NAFTA").  Throughout the paper, as is done in the language of the NAFTA itself, Canada, Mexico, or the United 
States may be referred to as "the Parties" collectively, or "Party" as individuals, when referred to in their roles as 
signatory states. 
4 Gourlie, supra note 1, at 423.  It should be noted that this paper assumes "economic benefit" to mean an increase in 
the net wealth of a country.  Free trade does bring complications, particularly in the redistribution of pre-existing 
wealth.  But that is a problem with how a society redistributes its wealth, not with the existence of free trade.  While 
it is an interesting topic, that problem is beyond the scope of this paper. 4 
 
To begin, I will very briefly discuss the historical background and structures of 
administrative law in the United States, Mexico, and Canada.  With a picture of administration in 
each country, I will compare and contrast the regulatory schemes for food labels in Mexico, 
Canada, and the United States.  My primary focus will be on the labeling of foods.
5  Next, I shall 
discuss the history underlying the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and some of 
its substantive provisions.  A particular emphasis will be placed upon its provisions regarding 
standards-related measures (SRMs).  Finally, I will look at the topic of harmonization and how to 
break down the barriers to trade between the three nations.  Though North America's quest for 
harmonization might seem daunting, it is not impossible.  A flexible approach that borrows from 
other free trade zones can be the starting point for greater realization of NAFTA's aims.   
 
II: HISTORY, GOVERNMENT, STRUCTURE 
The rise, scope and power of executive agencies in America has been well documented 
over the past few decades.
6  But that growth did not happen in a vacuum.  Federal agencies reach 
deeply into the everyday lives of Americans, and their fundamental structure and policies cannot 
be separated from the history of the United States.  Similarly, Mexico and Canada have large 
administrative states which govern their citizens’ day to day transactions.  Before delving into 
the actual regulations of the three nations, we must look briefly at the underpinnings of 
administrative law in each country.   
Administrative Law in America 
                                                 
5As regulations on food labels are incredibly extensive in all three countries, the discussion will only touch on a few 
particular aspects of the regulations.   
6 See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration,114 HVLR 2245 (2001). 5 
 
  In the 1920s, the United States government still roughly hewed to the design of the 
original Framers of the Constitution.  As any sixth grade civics lesson would impart, America 
has three branches of government where the Congress makes the laws, President executes the 
laws, and Supreme Court interprets the laws.  But that model was changed during the 1930s.  
President Roosevelt and Congress responded to the Great Depression by expanding the federal 
government with executive-run agencies.  The new agencies, subject to the limits set by 
Congressional statutes, would craft new rules to regulate various industries, then police and 
administer those rules.   
  To maintain order among the agencies, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
7 was 
enacted in 1946.  The bill was a triumph of compromise, whose unanimous passage was the 
culmination of years of debate and negotiation among politicians and interested parties.  Very 
roughly speaking, the compromise was struck between New Deal Democrats who sought to keep 
a tight rein on industry and Republicans who felt that less government intervention would speed 
recovery after World War II. 
  The resultant APA sets forth a system hoping to nimbly create, enforce, and adjudicate 
rules that agencies produce.  Despite a measure of autonomy for the executive branch, the APA 
places a high priority on public/industry input and government transparency.
8  Interested parties, 
including private individuals, interest groups, and industry groups all get an opportunity to 
submit views to the agencies before they make rules.  The agencies must respond to those 
concerns as they promulgate their rules.  Some say that the American regulatory process, 
including food regulation, is too prone to industry capture, as industry is the most vigilant and 
                                                 
7Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§500 et seq. 
8 5 U.S.C. §553. 6 
 
active player in rulemaking.
9  True or not, it must be admitted that insofar as capture happens, it 
occurs in plain sight.  There is a political price to be paid by any administration that appears too 
beholden to special interests, and this does act as somewhat of a balance. 
Administrative Law in Mexico 
  Whereas the United States' administrative state came about through inter-party 
compromise, Mexico's came about through one-party, authoritarian, centrally-controlled 
government.
10  Any discussion of Mexico's system of government and administrative laws 
necessarily entails a glance at Mexico's larger political history.
11  From its establishment in the 
1920s, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Instutional Revolutionary Party, "PRI") had 
near-ubiquitous control over Mexico until 2000.
12  Pursuing a wide-tent strategy, the PRI 
maintained political power through satisfying many separate constituencies' pet issues.
13  In 
return for spreading patronage jobs and resources throughout the country, the PRI received 
support and loyalty from local governments and the populous.   
  The power concentrated in Mexico City did not disperse among the three branches.  PRI's 
power was always exercised through an "unfettered" executive branch.
14  The Mexican Congress 
of Deputies, especially during PRI's hegemony, has historically been little more than a rubber 
                                                 
9 Todd Mumford, Voluntary International Standards: Incorporating "Fair Trade" Within Multi-Lateral Trade 
Agreements, 14 SWJLTA 171, 177 (2007). 
10 Zamora, Cossío, Pereznieto, Roldán and Lopez, Mexican Law, 134 (2004).   
11 Id. at 133.  
12 Id. 
13 Ernesto Hernández-López, Law, Food, and Culture: Mexican Corn's National Identity cooked in "Tortilla 
Discourses" Post-TLC/NAFTA, 20 STTLR 670, 678 (2008). 
14 Id. at 136. 7 
 
stamp on the president's initiatives.
15  Likewise, the Mexican courts, which follow the civil law 
tradition, are institutionally weak.
16   
Though the Mexican president is endowed with more powers than the American 
President,
17 he too exerts influence on federal agencies primarily through appointment of allies to 
cabinet posts.
18  With no Mexican counterpart to the APA until 1994, ministries could be run as 
the private fiefdoms of the president and his ministers.  The lack of political opponents or 
accountability bred corruption within Mexico's federal agencies.
19  Laws and regulations were 
often passed solely on the President's orders; without public input or meaningful debate.   
  The political landscape in Mexico has changed a great deal since 2000, when opposition 
candidate Vicente Fox, of the Partido Acción Nacional (National Action Party, or PAN) won the 
presidency.
20  There is now a proliferation of political parties and the Mexican Congress is no 
longer dominated by PRI.  Congress now provides opposition to the president when they please, 
even if the institution remains comparatively weak.
21  The 1990s de-nationalization of industry 
has resulted in fewer federal agencies, fewer patronage jobs, and a somewhat less corrupt civil 
                                                 
15 Id. at 152. 
16 Id. at 78) 
17 The Mexican President's powers are outlined by the Mexican Constitution.  In Article 89, some of the most 
important powers include the propose legislation for the Congress of Deputies to pass, promulgate regulations 
subject to the laws passed by the Congress of Deputies, appointing the cabinet ministers to manage and conduct 
foreign affairs.  In Article 73 he receives the power to promulgate laws respecting Mexicans' health without the 
approval of the Congress of Deputies. 
18 Zamora et al., supra note 10, at 292.  It should be noted that the Mexican President does have more direct control 
over his ministries than the American President.  The Mexican President's powers also extend to removal of cabinet 
ministers.   
19 Id. at 310.  
20 In 2000, President Fox also passed an updated law, the Ley Federal de Prodecimienoto Administrativo ("Federal 
Law of Administrative Prodecure"), which sets out standards for administrative lawmaking in Article III.  Some 
important ones include requirements that administrative laws must be passed: by a competent body; in the public 
interest; recorded and signed; grounded in law and supported by facts; and passed pursuant to procedural formalities 
21 Zamora et al., supra note 10, at 185.  8 
 
service.
22  Despite these fairly recent changes, much of the regulatory scheme created under the 
PRI remains.  And though it is no longer a one-party state, the regulatory power in Mexico still 
does, and will for some time, travel directly through the President in Mexico City.   
Administrative Law in Canada 
  Like the U.S. and Mexico, administrative law in Canada is the place where the law 
touches people's day to day lives.  The purposes of administrative agencies in Canada would 
seem familiar to any student of American law: expertise, flexibility, speed of administration, 
innovation, sheer practicality.
23  However, Canada's system is built on a much different 
foundation.  Administrative law in Canada is wholly the pursuit of a fair relationship between 
Canadian individuals and the state.
 24  There is no counterpart to the APA, no assessment of the 
complicated dynamics between the legislature, agencies, judiciary and individuals.  Rather, the 
questions at issue in administrative law cases are simple: "How does the government relate to the 
individual?  Has that relationship been fair?"  It is the duty to act fairly and in the interests of 
fundamental justice,
25 which undergirds all administrative law in Canada.   
Unlike America and Mexico, whose systems of administration follow a predictable plan 
from congressional legislation to executive agencies, in Canada, the administrative bodies can be 
any creature of statute.
26  Known as "administrative tribunals," they can take many forms.  Some 
would be familiar to American and Mexican observers, some would not.  Health Canada, which 
would look a great deal like the American FDA, is of the former category.  In the latter category 
                                                 
22 Zamora et al., supra note 10, at 169. 
23 Neil Boyd, Canadian Law, 274 (2002).   
24 Id., at 273. 
25 This duty arises from the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, §7.   
26 Boyd, supra note 23, at 275. 9 
 
are universities, provincially-created commissions and any boards with a tie to statute.  The only 
requirement is that the body has been delegated power by the Canadian Parliament.
27   
   The delegation of authority to these administrative bodies created a need for Canadian 
courts to ensure that individuals were treated according to the government's duty to act fairly.  In 
contrast to the U.S., where administrative law inhabits an uneasy netherworld at the intersection 
of "unconstitutional," "too big to get rid of after 80 years," administrative law in Canada is 
uncontroversially not a constitutional body of law.  Though it does not derive from Canadian 
constitutional law, it is still beholden to the constitution's edicts, in particular the command that 
all Canadians will be served by "fundamental justice."
28   
  Under this scheme, agencies such as Health Canada operate with wide latitude to affect 
the lives of Canadians, as long as they obey statutory guidelines and are fair.  Both substantive 
and procedural administrative decisions are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, and 
are rarely overturned.
29  Health Canada would therefore have had a largely free hand in 
promulgating its food labeling regulations.   
 
III: THREE COUNTRIES, THREE SETS OF REGULATIONS 
Influences and Decision Making: Mexico 
                                                 
27 Boyd, supra note 23, at 274. 
28 Id.  A brief explanation of Canadian law might be useful.  Canada has two texts which Americans might conceive 
of as "constitutional" documents: The British North America Act of 1867, and the Constitution Act of 1982.  These 
two documents are where Canada was established as an independent entity and Canadians get their fundamental 
rights and structures of government.  Though Canadian administrative law is not derived from either of these texts, it 
must not violate any precepts within them.  For an excellent outline of the Canadian legal structure, see, Boyd, supra 
note 23. 
29 Id., at 280. 10 
 
In Mexico, the labeling of prepackaged food is governed by multiple statutes and 
regulations.  Primary among them are the Ley General de Salud ("General Law of Health," 
hereafter referred to as the "LGS," in reference to its Spanish title.),
30 and the Reglamento de 
Control Sanitario de Productos y Servicios ("Regulation of Sanitary Control of Products and 
Services," hereafter referred to as "RSCPS.").
31  The LGS, passed by the Mexican Congress of 
Deputies ("Congreso de Diputades) in 1984, is incredibly broad, and grants wide rulemaking 
authority to the executive branch of the Mexican government.  The LGS charges the Secretariat 
of Health with administering food labeling regulations,
32 while the Ley Orgánica de 
Administracíon Pública Federal ("Organic Law of Federal Public Administration") directs the 
Secretariat of Commerce and Industrial Promotion to actually establish the regulations.
33 The 
most recent version of these regulations, passed in 1994, is known as the Especificaciones 
generales de etiquetado para alimentos y bebidas no alcohólicas preenvasado ("General 
specifications for labeling prepackaged foods and nonalcoholic beverages," hereafter referred to 
as the "NORMA," in reference to the fact that it is a "Norma Oficial de México.").
34   
                                                 
30 Ley General de Salud [L.G.S.][General Law of Health], as amended, Título 12, Capítulo 1, Artículo 194.I, Diario 
Oficial de la Federación, 7 de febrero de 1984 (Mex.). 
31 Reglamento de Control Sanitario de Productos y Servicios [R.C.S.P.y S.] [Regulation of the Sanitary Control of 
Products and Services], Título 1, Capítulo 1, Artículo. 1, Diario Oficial de la Federación, 9 de agosto de 1999 
(Mex.).  The RSCPS is an act of the Congress of Deputies whose provisions relevant to prepackaged food labels are 
verbatim reproductions of corresponding provisions in the NORMA (see note 7 below), which was passed five years 
earlier.  Thus, the NORMA's §3.16, the definition of "label,"and §4, specifications for food labels, are the blueprint 
for the RSCPS's Article 2, Section V and Article 25.  Since they are identical, rather than repeat the same 
definitions, I will focus upon the NORMA, which is narrowly concerned with food labels, and which has other 
relevant specifications.   
32 Ley General de Salud, Artículo 195. 
33 Ley Orgánica de Administración Pública Federal [L.O.A.P.F.] [Federal Organic Law of Public Administration], 
Artículo 34.1, Diario Oficial de la Federación, 29 diciembre de 1976 (Mex.). 
34 Especificaciones generales de Etiquetado para alimentos y bebidas no alcohólicas preenvasados. [General 
Specifications of packaging for prepackaged foods and non-alcoholic beverages], Diario Oficial de la Federación, 24 
de enero 1996 (Mex.).  Note, the rules on capitalization of titles in Spanish are different from English. 11 
 
Since Mexico has a civil law tradition, courts depend mightily upon the literal text of 
legislation for guidance, rather than look to other sources of law such as legislative history.
35  
Mexican courts presume that laws have been written in their entirety, and efforts are made by 
legislators and regulators to clearly express their intentions and include extraordinary detail in 
the text of all rules and laws.
36  As a result, the Mexican Congress of Deputies does not produce 
legislative history as Americans might consider it.  Therefore, in analyzing Mexico's food 
labeling regulations, all discussion will be limited to language actually included in the published 
law.
37 
  The NORMA's preliminary provisions state that, in addition to the Secretariat of Health, 
a plethora of Mexican governmental agencies played their part in crafting the regulation.
38 The 
Secretariats of Commerce and Industrial Promotion, Fisheries, Social Development, and 
Agriculture and Water were all represented, along with the Mexican Consumer Protection 
Agency.  This broad list of actors is appropriate, given how deeply the regulation of labeling of 
prepackaged food reaches into the country's activity.   
A prominent omission from the list of participants, however, is the Secretariat of Foreign 
Relations.  Specifically within that office, the Economic Relations and International Cooperation 
Unit
39 (ERICU) would have been instrumental in calling attention to the implications of any 
regulatory scheme on the newly-minted NAFTA.  The ERICU may also have been able to 
contribute information on anticipated changes to regulations in the United States and Canada.  
                                                 
35 Zamora et al., supra note 10, at 100 Oxford (2004). 
36 Id., at 78.  
37 There is, however, a good deal of non-operative information published in the NORMA. 
38 Especificaciones generales de Etiquetado para alimentos y bebidas no alcohólicas preenvasados, supra note 34, 
Preface. 
39 This is Mexico's counterpart to the United States Trade Representative.  Its Spanish name is the "Unidad de 
Relaciones Económicas y Cooperación Internacional." 12 
 
While such insights may be brought by industry or even the purely domestic Mexican 
governmental agencies, it is likely that governmental representatives with an international 
mission are best-placed to take a more global view of costs and benefits.  
On behalf of private industry, there were dozens of representatives, including many large 
multi-national corporations.
40  Some of the representatives from the private sector are well-
known in the United States, such as Proctor & Gamble, Kellog's, and Kraft.  However, there 
were also other massive, non-U.S. - centric international food producing corporations.  Most 
notable among them is the Bimbo Group.  Bimbo Group's Latin-American oriented baking 
empire has made it the preeminent food producer in Mexico, and one of the largest baked-goods 
distributors in the entire world.
41   
The agendas and motivations for large corporations operating across borders may be 
mixed.  On the one hand, it stands to reason that these large corporations, who already have 
expertise in operating trans-nationally, may have been interested in the opening of new markets 
in America and Canada.  On the other hand, as much as each company might want entry into the 
other market, there seems a powerful incentive to maintain the status quo.  Large companies in 
hegemonic positions may not look favorably towards new competitors.  While Bimbo owns a 
Texas-based subsidiary,
42 most of Bimbo's foreign business looks towards Latin America.
43  For 
                                                 
40 Especificaciones generales de Etiquetado para alimentos y bebidas no alcohólicas preenvasados, supra note 34 
Preface. 
41 From the Grupo Bimbo website, available at: 
http://www.grupobimbo.com.mx/display.php?section=1&subsection=26 (last visited on 3-16-09) 
42 From the Grupo Bimbo website, available at:  http://www.grupobimbo.com.mx/display.php?section=2 (last 
visited on 3-17-09) 
43 From the Grupo Bimbo website, available at: 
http://www.grupobimbo.com.mx/display.php?section=1&subsection=26 (last visited on 3-16-09) 13 
 
Bimbo, harmonization with the United States might be nice, but maintaining the already-in-place 
harmonization with other Latin American countries is even better.
44   
Given the above marketplace factors, it does not take much imagination to craft a 
scenario where Mexican-owned Bimbo (who owns cookie-maker Entmann's)
45might be quite 
happy to maintain substantial standards harmonization with Spanish-speaking South American 
countries, while simultaneously striking a blow to the Mexican expansion plans of American-
owned Kellog's (who owns Keebler's and Famos Amos cookies
46).  
Such an attempt to thwart competition (with harmonization as collateral damage) might 
also have benefits for Mexican consumers. Sharing a language and more similar diets, Mexico 
and Latin American consumers and producers alike might not want to trade South and Central 
American harmonization for North American harmonization.  Given the interests represented at 
the regulations' promulgation, and the absence of key public entities, Mexico's ultimate 
regulations, unaligned as they are with Canada and the United States, are no surprise.   
Influences and Decision Making: Canada 
  Like Mexico, Canada's prepackaged food labeling is also covered by multiple laws and 
regulations.  The two main Parliamentary laws are the Consumer Packaging and Labelling Act of 
1985
47 [sic]
48 and the Food and Drugs Act of 1985.
49  Both of those Parliamentary statutes are 
                                                 
44 Mexico's prepackaged food labeling standards, as will be discussed below, are an intentional adoption of the 
Codex Alimentarius "General Standard for the Labelling of Prepackaged Foods.  Codex is also the preferred 
standard in the large South American nations of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.  See p. 32 of 
Understanding the Codex Alimentarius, available at: 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/codex/Publications/understanding/Understanding_EN.pdf 
45 http://www.grupobimbo.com.mx/display.php?section=2 
46 http://www2.kelloggs.com/ 
47 Consumer Packaging and Labelling Act, R.S.C, ch. C-38 (1985).  The Consumer packaging and Labelling Act  
was included in a major re-organization of Canadian statutes in 1985.  As such, it is now referred to popularly as the 
Consumer Packaging and Labelling Act of 1985, though it is actually directly derived from a law passed in 1970. 14 
 
supplemented by regulations.  Health Canada is given a great deal of discretion to promulgating 
standards to give the two acts sufficient detail.
50  The resultant regulations are the Consumer 
Packaging and Labelling Regulations,
51 and the Food and Drugs Regulations.
52  The Minister of 
Health, operating through the Canada Food Inspection Agency, is designated as the primary 
enforcement agent.
53 
  In 2006, the Canadian Parliament spent time discussing amendment to the Food and Drug 
Act.  Food labeling was the major focus of debate.  The debate played out much along what one 
would expect in a legislature discussing regulation.
54  Some Members of Parliament were all for 
greater regulation and greater information for consumers.
55  Some Members said that the benefits 
to consumers, while considerable, simply did not justify the costs to industry.
56  Some Members 
said, essentially, that it was a close debate, and that the Parliament should leave the truly difficult 
decisions to the expertise of Health Canada.
57  In an impassioned plea before the bill's ultimate 
defeat, one of the Parliament's most pro-labeling-regulation members, Member Tom Wappel of 
the Scarborough Southwest district, emphasized that food labeling is in the interests of 
                                                                                                                                                             
48 Rather than write [sic] after every instance of Canadian or British spelling of the word, "labeling," I will just note 
that if it is spelled, "labelling," elsewhere in the paper it is because  I am using the Canadian spelling. 
49 Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C., ch. F-27 (1985).  Like the Consumer Packaging and Labelling Act, supra note 47, 
the Food and Drugs Act of 1985 is a direct descendant of an act passed decades earlier.  The original version of the 
Food and Drugs Act was passed by the Canadian Parliament in 1953. 
50 Id., §30 (1) (b) 
51 Consumer Packaging and Labelling Regulations (Consumer Packaging and Labelling Act), C.R.C., ch. 417. 
52 Food and Drug Regulations (Food and Drugs Act), C.R.C. ch. 870. 
53 R.S.C. ch. F-27 ,§22 (1). 
54 The particular debate discussed herein was made on 11-2-06.  Legislative debate in the Canadian House of 
Commons can be found on the Parliament's website, at: 
http://www2.parl.gc.ca/housechamberbusiness/ChamberPublicationIndexSearch.aspx?arpist=b&arpidf=2006%2f04
%2f03&arpidt=2007%2f09%2f14&arpid=True&arpij=False&arpice=False&arpicl=&arpics=True&arpicp=True&ar
picd=True&arpico=True&arpicc=True&ps=Parl39Ses1&Language=E&Mode=1&arpit=&arpitp=F&arpialtid=3756
1,39252&arpicpd=2463069#Para239588 (last visited on 3-29-09). 
55 See Member Martin's comments in the legislative debate. 
56 See Member Cullen's comments in the legislative debate. 
57 See Member Kramp's comments in the legislative history.   15 
 
consumers, and that Parliament ought to represent those interests. The bill ultimately was 
soundly defeated (more than 2-1) in a clear show of support for the food industry's interests over 
consumers.   
In other records
58 from that session of Parliament, the House of Commons debated 
whether Canada should harmonize its standards with Codex Alimentarius Commission's 
standards for genetically modified foods labeling.   In that discussion, polling data was 
introduced which showed that 80% of Canadian consumers wanted mandatory labeling about 
genetically modified organisms in food.  Despite the apparent popularity of such a measure, that 
bill did not pass, either.   
The debates and results in Canada's Parliament are illustrative of the fact that food 
labeling regulation has its defenders in the Parliament, but that the food industry also has 
significant representation.  Perhaps the most illuminating comment was the one stating that 
Canada Health (an apolitical body) has heretofore done a good job regulating, and Parliament 
should not concern itself.  It speaks to the reluctance by Parliament to take up an issue which has 
already been through the political process.  The members of Parliament do not want to fight a 
battle that is not necessary when an agency could do it instead.    
While the issue of more consumer information is quite popular among Canadians, the 
issue of international harmonization would be much more difficult.  It brings up issues of 
sovereignty and independence, which will always be thorny in Canada.
59  Given the political 
realities of harmonization and intensive food regulation, it seems unlikely that the present 
                                                 
58 This debate was from 6-12-06.  Available at: 
http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=39&Ses=1&DocId=3033
868#OOB-2146118  
59 See Part V, infra. 16 
 
Canadian Parliaments will take up the issue of harmonization.  That task would have to fall to 
Health Canada.   
Influences and Decision Making: United States of America 
  Like its NAFTA partners, the United States regulates its prepackaged food labels through 
both statute and regulations.  The pertinent
60 statute is the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C 
Act).
61 The FDC Act is regularly amended with major recent amendments relevant to this paper 
coming with the Nutritional Labeling and Education Act of 1993 (NLEA), and the Food and 
Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA).
62  The FD&C Act charges the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services
63 with enforcing the Act, as well as both promulgating 
and enforcing regulations concerning food labels.
64 The agency through which the Secretary 
accomplishes this mandate is the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. 
  In 1997, only a few years after the passage of NAFTA, Congress passed the Food and 
Drug Association Modernization Act of 1997.  The FDAMA did contain a passage of language 
to encourage harmonization
65 with international bodies.  However, the Congressional record 
reveals that the provision encouraging international harmonization of standards was drawn up 
primarily out of concern for international pharmaceutical standards instead of than food.
66  
                                                 
60 The Fair Packaging and Labeling Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§1451-1461 (2000), also has provisions concerning the 
labeling of food.  This statute aims for accurate labeling of quantities within packages to "facilitate value 
comparisons" between like products.  Though still good law, its provisions relevant to this paper are duplicated by 
the FD&C Act.     
61 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C., §§301-399.  
62 Nutritional Labeling and Education Act of 1993, 21 U.S.C. 343 (q).  Food and Drug Administration 
Modernization Act of 1997, 21 U.S.C. 353 (a). 
63 21 U.S.C. 371 (a). 
64 Food and Drug Administration, Department of Health and Human Resources, 21 C.F.R. pt. 1. 
65 21 U.S.C. §383 
66 See e.g., 143 Cong.Rec. S12241-02 (1997) (Statement by Senator Mosely-Braun).  Senator Mosely-Braun's 
comments were one of many which conveyed a focus upon the drug industry and not the food industry.  Though the 
comments make clear that the Act was focused upon drugs, the statutory language of the Act is actually broad 
enough that it could be seen to include food regulations.   17 
 
Indeed, it appears that while Congress recognized the relevance of harmonization, the FDAMA 
was not intended force the issue with regards to food labeling.   
  In 1999, the FDA took it upon itself to declare an intention to participate more fully in the 
harmonization of international food regulations.
67  In a thorough paper, entitled, Affirmative 
Agenda for International Activities, FDA recognizes that the agency faces rising expectations 
and pressure from other U.S. government agencies, American industry, and the international 
community to participate more fully in harmonizing regulatory initiatives.  It also declares an 
intention to lead in the development of the Codex Alimentarius Commission's
68  international 
food regulations (even singling out food labeling as an area of interest).  At the same time, the 
FDA asserts that its primary mission is domestic in nature and its resources are limited.  As such, 
FDA will address issues from a domestic perspective—notwithstanding the international effect 
policy decisions may have.   
From a 2009 perspective, the FDA's 1999 document appears naïve.  Amid an era of 
declining America popularity abroad, the FDA's stated intent to lead the development of the 
Codex standards without actually subscribing to them is somewhat of a contradiction in terms.  
As the American scheme makes any non-adherence to the FD&C Act a misbranding, the 
practical effect of FDA's stance is, "If Codex doesn't follow the FD&C Act verbatim, it will 
result in no benefit to producers trying to export to the U.S."  On some levels, this could be a 
                                                 
67 See the FDA Affirmative Agenda for International Activities (1999), available at: 
http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~comm/intlact.html (last visited on 3-27-09). 
68 The Codex Alimentarius Commission is an international body, created in 1963 by FAO and WHO.  It still 
operates under the umbrella of those two organizations, and develops standards and guidelines to protect the health 
of consumers, ensure fair trade practices in the food industry.  Another significant aim of the commission is to 
promote harmonization of food standards throughout the world.  Available online at: 
http://www.codexalimentarius.net/web/index_en.jsp (last visited on 3-27-09). 18 
 
valid policy—American industry and consumers can support a more onerous regulatory system 
than many developing nations.   
On other levels, however, FDA's policy has not worked to guide international regulations 
towards American standards.  In the 10 years since FDA declared an intention to harmonize 
international regulations, Codex Alimentarius has settled on a set of standards which track the 
European Union's regulations, not America's.  The FDA policy on Codex,
69 is that it will 
consider adoption of Codex standards, but that it has discretion on whether or not to adopt them.  
Keeping in mind FDA's comment that it is limited by resources and statutory demands, 
America's regulatory disharmony with the world may well continue until Congress decides to 
dramatically alter the system of food regulation by mandating harmonization.   
 
IV: SUBSTANTIVE FOOD LABELING PROVISIONS 
This part will compare and contrast various provisions regulating labels for each of the 
NAFTA Parties.  The actual statutes passed by the Mexican Congress of Deputies, U.S. Congress 
and Canadian Parliament are largely similar as they relate to food labeling.  All three countries 
have governing statutes which broadly outline legislative purpose, dictate only a few specific 
mandates, then leave many details to regulatory bodies.   
Though the legislative bodies of all three nations may have been of similar minds, the 
cession of authority to regulatory agencies is what produces the disharmony among regulations.  
All three countries have had major food legislation or regulation since the NAFTA was signed in 
                                                 
69 21 C.F.R. § 130.6 19 
 
1992.
70  The timing of the regulations' promulgation is significant for the purposes of this paper 
because the regulations were finalized two years after the NAFTA had been consented to by all 
three participating nations.  Thus, they were considered and negotiated in the full knowledge of 
the NAFTA and its exhortation for harmonized regulations between the three nations.  As the 
regulations show, NAFTA's provisions alone were not enough to ensure that the Parties' agencies 
promulgated harmonized rules.   
Intention to Harmonize 
   Before international harmonization may be discussed, one must consider the declared 
intentions of the various governments.  Mexico's NORMA expressly aligns
71 itself with the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission's General Standard for the Labelling of Prepackaged Foods 
(1985).
72  Though the Codex Alimentarius Commission itself aims for harmonization, two 
notable abstainers from its standards are Canada and the United States.  The Codex, and thus the 
Mexican, regulations are of a familiar tone to the American and Canadian models, but they are 
somewhat briefer and less minutely detailed.    
While Mexico's official regulations affirmatively acknowledge a desire to harmonize 
with international standards, Canada only mentions international harmonization in the 
"Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement,"
73 of the Canada Gazette,
74 in which the regulations 
                                                 
70 In the United States, there was the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, in Canada, they 
had significant regulatory reform in 2003, and in Mexico, the Ley General de Salud was last amended in 2007.   
71 Especificaciones generales de Etiquetado para alimentos y bebidas no alcohólicas preenvasados, supra note 34 
§10.   
72 Available at: http://www.codexalimentarius.net/web/standard_list.do?lang=en.   
73 The Canada Gazette, 1-1-2003 at 365.  The Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement is a non-legally-binding 
comment accompanying new regulations, which is put forth by the Canadian government to explain various 
provisions therein.   
74The Canada Gazette is a government publication, similar in many ways to the United States' Federal Register 20 
 
were published.  The Statement makes note that Canada Health based their new regulations on 
the United States' NLEA.
75   
For its part, the United States' FD&C Act discusses international harmonization with 
respect to pesticide chemical residues on food,
76 but declines to do so in the context of food 
labels.  Indeed, the pesticides chemical residues provision expressly invokes the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission and implies encouragement, if not preference, for international 
harmonization.  The FD&C Act says that the Administrator shall first look to Codex standards 
and, if she elects to depart from them, she must explain her reasons for doing so.  Given that 
Congress has displayed an ability to encourage harmonization when it wants to do so (as it has 
for pesticides), the absence of any similar provision with regards to food labels could be taken to 
mean that Congress had no intention of harmonization with the U.S.' North American 
neighbors.
77   
From the actions of the three governments, it is clear that international harmonization has 
not escaped the attention of anyone.  Though all three NAFTA Parties have addressed the matter, 
they all take a different approach.  Mexico sees its interests best served by looking outward, 
rather than inwards to North America.  Canada sees benefit in aligning itself with the U.S., but is 
determined to tailor its policies as it sees fit.  And the United States acknowledges that 
harmonization is an issue, but it cannot overtake the domestic mission assigned to FDA by 
statute.     
                                                 
75 See note 62, supra. 
76 Id. at §346a (b) (4). 
77 In one respect, this may not be evidence of Congressional intention to ignore NAFTA's exhortation to 
harmonization of standards, since the FD&C Act was made prior to NAFTA's enactment.  However, NAFTA's 
major negotiations took place in 1992, and the FD&C Act is regularly amended.  In any event, it has now been 15 
years since NAFTA officially took effect, and the FD&C Act contains no language encouraging harmonization.   21 
 
Objective of the Label 
  Each government, in promulgating these standards, does so for a reason.  The 
purpose of labeling regulations, as reflected in the language used by each of the NAFTA Parties' 
governments, is similar, though not fully consistent.  The different ways to express the intentions 
of food labels reflect some of the differences in governmental structure described earlier in this 
paper.   
The Mexican NORMA begins with a common sense objective:  
"[T]o ensure that products marketed within [Mexico] bear the necessary commercial information 
so that consumers and users can properly make their decisions about buying, using, and fully 
benefiting from the products and services they acquire."
78   
 
Though the directions are all ones which direct how producers of food must act, the language 
seems to imply that, at the heart of the matter, Mexican regulators were concerned with the 
consumers. 
The Canadian purpose in regulating labels points much more towards producers.  "No 
person shall label . . . any food in a manner that is false, misleading or deceptive."
79  While the 
obvious beneficiaries of such a policy are consumers who needn't worry about being deceived, 
the purpose stated in the act is strictly one of prohibition for the producers.  Only on Canada 
Health's website does the Canadian government express a desire to help Canadian consumers,     
". . . make healthy and informed choices about the foods they eat."
80  
                                                 
78 Especificaciones generales de Etiquetado para alimentos y bebidas no alcohólicas preenvasados, supra note 34 
Front Matters. 
79 R.S.C. ch. F-27 §5.1 
80 From the Canada Health website, available at: http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/fn-an/label-etiquet/index-eng.php (last 
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Like Canada, America's labeling initiatives address themselves to the producers of food.  
Indeed, neither the FDA home page for labeling,
81 nor the FD&C Act nor the federal regulations, 
have provisions or commentary implying that the consumer is the central concern for food labels.  
Though the modern American regulatory scheme does concern itself with providing thorough 
information to consumers,
82 the language (or lack thereof) of the actual laws belies an FDA focus 
on industry as the most important stakeholder in food label regulation.   
Scope of Application 
As for applicability of food labeling regulations, the three countries go from near 
unlimited exemptions (Mexico), to highly specific limitations (United States), with Canada 
falling somewhere in between.   
The Mexican regulations apply very broadly, to "all prepackaged foods and nonalcoholic 
beverages … intended for consumption [in Mexico]."
83 The expansive inclusion, however, is 
tempered by an equally expansive category of exemptions, including, "other products determined 
by competent authorities…"
84  This provision keeps in line with the Mexican tendency to 
concentrate enormous amounts of discretion in the executive branch.
85 
 Canada, too, casts an initial wide net for requirement of labels and includes any 
prepackaged product.
86  However, unlike Mexico, Canada has more limited exemptions. The 
exemptions include food intended for commercial clients, raw fruit and vegetables bound with 
                                                 
81 http://www.foodsafety.gov/label.html (last visited on 3-24-09) 
82 Peter Barton Hutt, Food and Drug Law Cases and Materials, 96 (2006). 
83 Especificaciones generales de Etiquetado para alimentos y bebidas no alcohólicas preenvasados, §1.1  
84 Id., at §1.1 (c). 
85 Zamora et al., supra note 10, at 136. 
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less than 1/2 inch of packaging, individually-packaged confections, re-usable soft-drink 
containers,
87 and meat cooked on the retail premises.
88 
The United States regulations are similar to Canada's.  Rather than affirmatively 
including all foods, the U.S. exempts only specific foods from labeling requirements.  
Exemptions include: assortments of various foods, items received in bulk for resale in individual 
packets, and incidental additives to food.
89  The regulations also exempt specific foods from 
selected provisions of the FD&C Act.  Examples of this category include some fruits and 
vegetables, foods re-packaged at the retail establishment where they shall be sold, and various 
dairy products.
90 
Definition of Food and Labels 
  It seems fundamental that the regulation of food labels must begin with definitions of 
both the terms "food" and "label."  As mentioned in the introduction to this paper, such common-
sense terms take on new complexity when asked to fit into a regulatory structure.  The 
definitions are of vital importance, as something that is not "food" in the government's definition, 
will not be subject to regulation.  The NAFTA Parties did not reach the same result when trying 
to address these complexities.   
For Mexico, food itself is defined as, "Any substance or product . . . intended for human 
consumption and that provides the organism with nutritional elements by oral ingestion."
91  It 
seems a simple definition, but it is also incomplete.  At the very least, there can be confusion as 
to what qualifies as a "nutritional element" under the meaning of the NORMA.   
                                                 
87 Consumer Packaging and Labeling Regulations (Consumer Packaging and Labelling Act), C.R.C. ch. 417 §§3-4.  
88 Food and Drug Regulations (Food and Drugs Act), C.R.C. §B.01.003 
89 21 C.F.R. § 101.100 (a) (1999). 
90 21 C.F.R. § 101.100 (b)-(g) (1999). 
91 Especificaciones generales de Etiquetado para alimentos y bebidas no alcohólicas preenvasados,  §3.2. 24 
 
Labels in Mexico are defined as any marking, tag, inscription, image, or other descriptive 
or graphic material that is written, stuck to, [or applied in many other ways] … on the 
packaging."
92  This is a fairly comprehensive definition, which aims to include as much as 
possible.   
Canada describes food as, ". . . any article manufactured, sold or represented for use as 
food or drink for human beings, chewing gum, and any ingredient that may be mixed with food 
for any purpose whatever."
93  The inclusion of chewing gum seems to expand the definition of 
food from Mexico's version. Chewing gum might not be covered under the Mexican definition 
for it is neither "consumed" nor "ingested,"
94 and its provision of "nutritional elements" is 
minimal.     
As to labels, Canada has defined labels as, ". . . any legend, word or mark attached to, 
included in, belonging to or accompanying any food."
95  Like Mexico, Canada's definition of a 
label seems to aim to include as much as possible under its terms. 
The United States goes one step further in expanding the definition of food by including 
food intended for non-human animals.  The FD&C Act defines food as, ". . . articles used for 
food or drink for man or other animals . . ."
96 and includes chewing gum and ingredients for 
those articles.  Like its Canadian and Mexican counterparts, the American statute defines labels 
as broadly as possible.  The FD&C Act's definition is quite long, and leaves nothing to chance in 
casting a wide net.
97    
                                                 
92 Especificaciones generales de Etiquetado para alimentos y bebidas no alcohólicas preenvasados , §3.16. 
93 R.S.C., ch. F-27, §2 
94 Dictionary.com's definition of these two terms makes reference to absorption and taking "into" the body, rather 
than mere mastication.   
95 R.S.C., ch. f-27, §2  
96 21 U.S.C. §321 (f). 
97 Id., at §321 (k). 25 
 
In some respects, the definitional discrepancies are reconcilable.  All three countries 
make an effort to include everything in their definition of labels, and it seems that the wording is 
all that would need changing.  However, by including articles used for "other animals," in the 
definition for food, the FD&C Act significantly expands the category of products which is 
regulated by corresponding statutes in Canada and Mexico.  To harmonize the three regulations, 
either Canada and Mexico, or the United States would need significant realignment of their 
domestic agencies' jurisdictions.   
Labeling Basics 
  Though the definitions of labels are largely similar, the requirements for all labels are 
different.  Even the slightest difference is important, as all three sets of regulations have 
provisions which would, if followed, thereby render the labels in derogation of regulations in the 
other two countries.     
Mexican labels have eleven requirements.  Each must include: the name of the food, 
ingredients, net content, additives, name and fiscal domicile of the producer, country of origin of 
the food, batch identification, expiration date and instructions for their proper storage.
98  In 
addition, each label is required to be written in Spanish (at least as prominently as any other 
language)
99 as well as using the International System of measurements for all quantities.
100  
Finally, Mexican labels' fonts and presentation (including the nutritional information) are 
circumscribed only by a requirement that letters be,
101 "clear . . . and be easily read by the 
consumer . . . ."  Only the brand name must be on the main exhibition surface of the packaging, 
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99 Id.. §4.2.11. 
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and all other information can be applied anywhere upon the surface of a label (or even below the 
surface, if easily legible) of a package.
102   
All Canadian prepackaged food labels must include: the net quantity,
103 common name of 
food, name and address of the producer,
104 list of ingredients of the food,
105 and a nutrition facts 
table.
106 In addition, certain foods require information on a food's durable life,
107 information 
regarding freezing of the food,
108 and information on artificial flavors.
109  The Canadian labels 
must be in both French and English,
110 and use either International System of measurement or 
Canadian Units.
111 
In the American iteration, prepackaged food labels must include the name and address of 
the producer and quantity of contents,
112 along with the common name of the food, and 
ingredients,
113 and a nutritional information panel.
114  All labels in the United States must be 
written at least in English
115 and can be displayed using the International System of 
Measurements.
116  
As is evident, the labels' requirements are substantially overlapping, yet still incongruent.  
One requirement where there is divergence, nutritional information, is particularly prominent.   
Nutritional Information 
                                                 
102 Id., at §4.2.10.1.5. 
103 R.S.C., ch. C-38, §4. 
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105 C.R.C., ch. 870, §B.01.008. 
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  Led by the United States in the 90s, nutritional information can today be found on food 
labels the world over.  By all accounts, nutritional information helps people make better-
informed choices regarding their diets by ensuring quality and avoiding consumer deception.
117  
One might presume that since human physiology has no nationality, and since proper scientific 
research should produce the same results in different countries, the information which is 
important for consumers to know about their food would be the same across jurisdictions.  
However, such is not the case, as the NAFTA Parties' incompatible regulations demonstrate. 
  In Mexico, the LGS commands that all food labels "include data of nutritional value . . . 
which shall contribute to the nutritional education of the population."
118  However, the 
NORMA's stance on nutritional information is that it is not required on all labels.
119  Mandatory 
labels are only triggered if the producer makes statements regarding the food's nutritional 
property.
120 In the event that nutritional information is required by such a statement, the required 
information is: energy content, proteins, carbohydrates, fat, and sodium, plus any vitamins about 
which claims are made.
121  The information for calories must be presented in calories (kcal) per 
100g; while fats, proteins, and carbohydrates
122 and sodium or the optional vitamins
123 must be 
presented as mass per 100g.  The vitamins may be expressed either in metric units or as a 
percentage of the recommended daily allowance for Mexicans.   
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  Since 2007, all prepackaged food labels for food sold in Canada must carry a "nutrition 
facts table,"
124 subject to specific exemptions.
125 The nutrition facts table must contain: a serving 
size,
126 energy content (in calories), fat, combined saturated and trans fat, carbohydrates, fibers, 
sugars and protein (each category in grams), cholesterol and sodium (both in milligrams), and 
calcium, iron, vitamin A and vitamin C (each as a percentage of recommended daily intake).
127  
The regulations contain considerable detail with regards to how to present this information.  For 
instance, there are specifications for how to properly round the fat content,
128 and the size and 
color of the font which must be on the nutritional facts table.
129 
  The mandatory
130 nutritional labels in the United States are, to an average consumer, 
indistinguishable from their Canadian counterparts.  Like Canada, the United States requires 
information on serving size, energy value, fat, saturated and trans fat, carbohydrates, fibers, 
sugars, protein, cholesterol and sodium, along with the amounts of calcium, iron, vitamin A and 
vitamin C.
131  All of these bits of information must be presented in the same units of measure as 
in Canada.  The details like the rounding of fat content,
132  and the presentation of nutritional 
information
133 are not absolutely consistent, but are so similar as to be functionally identical.
134  
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125 Id., §B.01.401. (2). 
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However, there are particular differences.  Unlike Canada, the United States also requires that 
the label convey how many servings are included in a given package of food.
135  The United 
States also requires that saturated and trans fats are displayed on separate rows
136 (whereas in 
Canada they are displayed as a sum of the two on only one line).   
  Harmonization of the nutritional labels is an area where harmonization seems the most 
attainable, yet willfully rejected.  It would require addition of only a few extra pieces of 
information to bring Mexican standards in line with America and Canada.  And to call the 
"differences" between the American and Canadian nutrition labels "useful" would be a disservice 
to the words "difference" and "useful."   
Disease-Related Claims 
So-called "disease-related claims" are basically claims made by producers on labels 
regarding the effect a particular non-drug food may have with regards to risk factors for a 
particular diet-affected disease.  They have the potential to be quite helpful to consumers—as a 
kind of short cut to making health-conscious purchasing decisions.  However, health claims also 
have the potential to be dangerously misleading.  For that reason, they are quite heavily regulated 
in all three countries. 
The LGS expressly forbids food packages from containing "hidden or obfuscated"
137 
claims relating to disease or illness,
138 but claims are not barred altogether.  That task is left to 
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the NORMA, whose list of prohibited categories of claims results in a complete ban on any 
disease-related claims,
139 along with any statement that "cannot be proved."
140 
In Canada, there was a similar ban upon health claims until 2002.
141 Then Health Canada 
adopted five of the ten claims then-permitted in the U.S. after having observed and studied the 
health claims permitted under the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act.
142  Any health claims in 
Canada must be made in regulation-prescribed language, and are limited to claims discussing: 
potassium's relationship to heart disease/blood pressure/stroke; calcium's relationship to 
osteoporosis; saturated and trans fats' relationship to heart disease; vegetables and fruit's 
relationship to cancer; various foods' relationships to dental problems.
143 
In the United States, the regulations are somewhat less prescribed and somewhat less 
limited.  Health claims in the United States are governed by the FD&C Act, which commands 
that all disease-related claims be approved by either the FDA on the basis of "significant 
scientific agreement," or another authoritative statement from the federal government or National 
Academy of Sciences.
144  While the U.S. standard looks nebulous on its face, FDA has construed 
the statute narrowly, and has only approved twelve disease-related claims.  They include: 
calcium and vitamin D's relationship to osteoporosis; fat's relationship to cancer; saturated fat 
and cholesterol's relationship to heart disease; dietary sweeteners and dental caries; fiber-
containing grain products, fruits, and vegetables' relationship to cancer; folic acid and neural tube 
defects; fruits and vegetables relationship to cancer; sodium and hypertension; fruits, vegetables 
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and grain products that contain soluble fiber's relationship to heart disease; soluble fibers' 
relationship to heart disease; soy protein relationship to heart disease; stanols/sterols' relationship 
to heart disease.
145   
The Canadian and American standards both claim to be based upon science.  Indeed, the 
claims permitted in the U.S. but not Canada are so-limited because the Canadian agency does not 
feel that the evidence is sufficiently convincing to warrant approval.
146  The hurdle to 
harmonization here seems to be one of getting the scientists to confer more thoroughly, instead 
of the bureaucrats. 
 
V: THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
This part of the paper will discuss the NAFTA and its historical background.  Making 
compatible new regulations is more than just logically reconciling interested industries and 
consumers. The three Parties have all co-existed on this continent for hundreds of years.  A treaty 
(or re-working of a treaty) between the three must take into account the history, relationships, 
and resultant concerns which arise out of this shared existence.   
In December of 1992, American President George H. W. Bush,
147 Mexican President 
Carlos Salinas, and Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney sat at a table in Texas and signed 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  Aiming for the same goals as the World 
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Trade Organization's General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs,
148 the agreement promised new 
opportunities for businesses and consumers across North America.   
The ultimate aim was the unencumbered movement of goods and services
149 across two 
of the world's longest unguarded land borders.  However, bringing 446, 000, 000 people
150 
together across three vast democracies, dozens of sovereign or semi-sovereign governments and 
scores of regulatory agencies was always going to be a massive undertaking.  As has already 
been shown by the few examples in the previous part of this paper, the differences in the 
regulations create a veritable labyrinth of regulations and red tape.  Compliance in one country is 
non-compliance in the other two; a legitimate marketing plan in two countries constitutes fraud 
in the other.  The opportunities for confusion abound.   
All three countries were ambivalent about entering into NAFTA.  The debate in the U.S. 
Congress provided insight into the way NAFTA and free trade tugged at American politicians: 
"When Jesse Helms and Jesse Jackson are against NAFTA and Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton 
are for it, one realizes the complexity and uncertainty of the issue."
151  Other unlikely bed 
fellows included Ralph Nader and Pat Buchannan (against the pact).  Balanced against the 
increased market access and historical success of free trade, were concerns over lost jobs and 
falling environmental standards.  In Canada, the newspapers recount that debates were all about 
sovereignty and maintaining Canada's independence.
152  And in Mexico there was concern about 
large American companies using their might to overwhelm local businesses.  These concerns 
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arose out of each country's past experiences with their neighbors, and their already-formed 
notions of their new trading partners.  It may be useful to investigate some of those histories 
before delving directly into the act.   
North American History Prior to NAFTA 
   Without entering into a regurgitation of the history of the United States, there are three 
moments which must be mentioned with regards to the present dynamics in North America.  The 
first is the time leading up to the War of 1812.  Next is the Mexican-American War of 1847-48, 
and the third is the end of World War II.  Early in U.S. history, the fate of the North American 
continent was unclear.  Particularly in Canada, which had been a sanctuary for British loyalists 
during the Revolutionary War, there was concern that large parts of the country would be 
annexed to the United States.  Though not the only cause, this was one of the precipitating 
sentiments of the War of 1812.  Britain and the United States ended the war with territory claims 
much similar to those before the war, but the impression was clear: Canada was to remain 
distinct from the United States.   
The United States in 1847 was a still young country, dwarfed by its neighbors to the 
north and south, and still unsettled within its confines.  After declaring war with Mexico under 
the banner of "manifest destiny," the United States Army advanced all the way to Mexico City.  
The terms of peace resulted in the United States' annexation of the modern-day American West.  
The United States was now the major power on the continent.   
Though ascendant in North America, the nation was not a major player outside of this 
hemisphere, militarily or economically.  Only after the end of World War II did the United States 
begin to wield the sort of influence which exists today.  Carrying the twin banners of free 34 
 
markets and democracy, in the second half of the Twentieth Century America became a super 
power whose reach extended throughout the world.  Within the continent, America's policy was 
not particularly hostile.  For instance, the U.S. no longer declared un-provoked wars with 
Mexico.  But it might be said that the U.S.'s treatment of Mexico and Canada was one of clients, 
rather than true equals.  While it might be inappropriate, it is a common refrain to hear 
Americans characterize Canada as the 51st state with polite people, and to Mexico as a great 
vacation spot where the water gets you sick.   
The colloquial perception of its neighbors notwithstanding, the Canada and Mexico are 
ideal trading partners for America.  As free trade becomes the world norm, businesses and 
consumers within the U.S. will have a preference to continue policies which have served the U.S. 
well over the last 50 years.   
Within both Canada and Mexico, however, the U.S.'s general policies created some 
tension.  Mexico ended the Twentieth Century well behind the United States and Canada in 
standard of living.
153  Mexico had never quite let go of the trauma of the Mexican-American 
War.  Just as all Americans know some history of the Revolutionary War and the Civil War, all 
Mexicans today know the story of how their northern neighbors forcibly took over half of their 
nation's territory in the 1840s.  This memory has bred an underlying sense of resentment towards 
the United States.  Added to the country's identity as a nation whose history includes a painful 
Spanish domination of indigenous peoples, there is a natural resistance towards anything with the 
odor of imperialism, including free trade.
154   
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In the 20th Century, the PRI's rhetoric championed a uniquely "Mexican" identity (which 
just happened to include fealty to PRI).  Among the virtues of modern Mexicans was the 
Mexican diet—based heavily upon corn.
155  As Mexican food became a world-wide export, it 
became a source of national pride, unity and independence.
156  With the advent of NAFTA, it 
was a particular concern that the American corn industry would overwhelm the Mexican sector. 
People did not like the idea that tortillas eaten in Mexico would come in packages saying, "Made 
in the U.S.A."  It was such a symbolically loaded issue that corn became one of the few goods 
which retained tariffs between the U.S. and Mexico for fully fifteen years after NAFTA's 
passage.
157   
With the opening of Mexico to America's massive corn industry, the problems have 
become acute.  Mexico now grows less corn, and purchases much of it from the United States. 
The result is that Mexican consumers now pay more for corn while they compete with American 
commuters for the use of the crop as ethanol.
 158   This is a highly unpopular fact in Mexico, and 
the politicians have been put on notice:
159 Mexicans will not be satisfied with NAFTA if they 
feel they're being they're being taken for a ride by the Americans.  Any changes that occur to 
NAFTA must keep in mind that the Mexican voting public will hold their leaders accountable for 
how much they are perceived to "cave" to American-imperial interests.
160 
                                                                                                                                                             
held access to the American market hostage until the tiny island nation of Vanuatu amended its gun laws to allow 
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Whereas Mexico's hesitancy towards the United States might be considered an 
outwardly-oriented suspicion, Canada's could be characterized as an inwardly-oriented inferiority 
complex.  Right from the end of the French and Indian War, Canada's history has been one 
caught between various forces competing for the hearts and minds of Canadians.  Part of the 
country has seen itself as quasi-French.  Part has seen itself as quasi-British.  And all the while, 
many have been trying to establish a national identity that is neither French, nor British, but 
Canadian above all else.  With the cultural tug-of-war raging in the foreground, in the Twentieth 
Century, the business community has cultivated tremendous ties with the United States in the 
background.  Today, the extent of Canada's economic ties to the United States might be 
illustrated by the fact that the United States receives approximately 80% of Canadian exports.
161   
Given the unavoidable bonds between the two nations, the smaller one will need to make 
sure its identity is recognized.  An outgrowth of Canada's desire to assert its independence is that 
much of Canada's immediate concern about NAFTA was that it was a cession of Canadian 
sovereignty to the United States.
162 A cursory glance at any major Canadian newspaper will 
show that nearly every page will have some allusion to the United States.  Any pact with the U.S. 
must be crafted in such a way to respect that Canadians are conscious of how they interact with 
the U.S., and they want, above all else, to maintain a Canadian identity. 
Substantive Provisions of NAFTA 
  Popularly known in English as "NAFTA," the North American Free Trade Agreement is 
an incredibly hopeful treaty.  The preamble to the treaty is all-encompassing in its scope:  
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The Government of Canada, the Government of the United Mexican States and the Government of 
the United States of America, resolved to: Strengthen the special bonds of friendship and 
cooperation among their nations;…Reduce distortions to trade;…Establish clear and mutually 
advantageous rules governing their trade;…[and] Ensure a predictable commercial framework for 
business planning and investment….
163 
 
The text speaks to a desire for more than a mere increase in trade.  The Preamble begins with 
"friendship and cooperation," before mentioning trade.  This is a logical step, trade thrives on 
relationships, and before private businesses can engage in trade, it behooves the governments to 
foster an environment conducive to trade. 
  It is a credit to the treaty's drafters that they knew that such an environment would 
necessitate affirmative action, not simply resolutions in the preamble.  As a baseline, they sought 
to avoid difficulties that would arise if too many regulatory entities had control over the terms of 
the agreement.  In an effort to limit the authoritative bodies involved in regulation, the agreement 
specifically states that any matters directly addressed in the treaty shall preempt state and 
provincial laws.
164   
  The objectives then declared an intention to "eliminate barriers to trade,"
165 and pledged 
to the creation of, "…effective procedures for the implementation and application of this 
agreement, for its joint administration and for the resolution of disputes …."
166  Though the 
elimination of barriers to trade was rightly the ultimate objective, it seems to put the cart before 
the horse by mentioning barrier-elimination before creating effective procedures for the 
agreement's joint administration.  In 15 years since the signing of NAFTA, the three nations have 
yet to effectively address the issue of joint administration of the agreement.  Though there is the 
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NAFTA Secretariat, it acts as more of a consultative liaison and dispute settlement body for 
businesses than as an administrative body.
167 
  In some respects, the objectives of the agreement have been realized.  Trade has 
undoubtedly increased,
168 and through that, the commercial relationships between businesses in 
all three countries have grown stronger.  But problems which were evident from the first days of 
the agreement remain.  Rather than solve them in one fell swoop, they were saved for later 
negotiations, later moments.   
  Created concurrent with, and parallel to the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, the 
NAFTA specifically incorporates provisions of the GATT to its terms.  Incorporation is good in 
that it does not create confusing international obligations for the treaty's signatories.  However, it 
is a negative matter in that it leaves unsolved the very same disputed issues that the Uruguay 
Round could not settle for GATT.  Specifically, NAFTA does not adequately address the matter 
of Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs).   
  Technical Barriers to Trade are dealt with in Chapter Nine of NAFTA: Standards-Related 
Measures.  Article 901 brings within its scope, "…standards-related measures…that may, 
directly or indirectly, affect trade in goods or services between the Parties, and to the measures of 
the Parties relating to such measures."
169  The Standards-Related Measures (SRMs) dealt with in 
Chapter Nine of NAFTA include many regulations, including the regulation of food labels.   
  One might presume that a free trade agreement's chapter on TBTs would begin by setting 
definite boundaries as to scope, before narrowing itself with regards to particulars.  However, 
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Chapter Nine departs from this plan at the outset by immediately creating a loophole.  It replaces 
Article 105's compulsory federal preemption
170 with language encouraging Parties to "seek" state 
and provincial adherence to the agreement.
171  This slackening of compulsion is inimitable to the 
Preamble’s stated goal of predictability.  Insofar as any Party or sub-division of a Party is able to 
depart from a common regulatory scheme, there will be less free trade because of timidity among 
businesses.  In the context of labeling requirements, the mere uncertainty of regulatory outcomes 
and Article 902's intentional allowance for change may be a barrier in itself.   
  If Article 902 may be seen as an un-exploited loophole to discordant regulations, Article 
904: Basic Rights and Obligations, could only be characterized as a well-received and gratefully-
accepted invitation.   
Each party may … adopt, maintain or apply any standards-related measure, including any such 
measure relating to safety, the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, the environment 
or consumers, and any measure to ensure its enforcement or implementation.  Such measures 
include those to prohibit the importation of a good of another Party . . . .
172 
 
This article provides the justification by which the Parties have all established and actively 
maintained their discordant SRMs on labels.  As if attempting to emphasize each country's 
sovereign right to impede trade by creating discordant regulations, the Agreement continues:  
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Chapter, each Party may, in pursuing its legitimate 
objectives of safety or the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, the environment or 
consumers, establish the levels of protection that it considers appropriate in accordance with 
Article 907 (2).
173 (emphasis added) 
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Given the reality of the many interests pulling any nation's regulations in multiple directions, it is 
– and must have been at the time of drafting – obvious that each country would eventually arrive 
at different "appropriate" levels of protection.   
But the NAFTA, particularly in Chapter Nine, is an exercise in contradictions.  In a later 
section of the very same Article 904 which invites discordant regulations, the Agreement 
prohibits SRMs "with the effect of creating an unnecessary obstacle to trade between the 
Parties."
174  The imprecise language in Article 904 promotes conflict.  It simultaneously allows 
each Party to make its own regulations as it "considers appropriate" while mandating that the 
differences cannot be "unnecessary."  It is hard to imagine that the drafters did not know that 
such terms as "appropriate" and "unnecessary" are highly malleable.     
Indeed, pursuit of NAFTA's ultimate objective of unfettered movement in goods suggests 
that there would be language requiring the use of common international standards.  With that in 
mind, the NAFTA declares: "Each Party shall use, as a basis for its standards-related measures, 
relevant international standards . . . except where such standards would be an ineffective or 
inappropriate means to fulfill its legitimate objectives . . . . "
175  It might be noted that the 
language implies a requirement by saying each Party "shall" use international standards as a 
basis for their own SRMs.  However, as with other harmonization-promoting sections of the 
Agreement, the same Article proceeds to nullify any language which would suggest a 
compulsion for the Parties to harmonize their regulations:  
Nothing in paragraph 1 shall be construed to prevent a Party, in pursuing its legitimate objectives, 
from adopting, maintaining, or applying any standards-related measure that results in a higher 
level of protection than would be achieved if the measure were based on the relevant international 
standard.
176   
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At first glance, this is an unassailable provision.  Allowing for a "higher level of protection" in 
pursuit of legitimate objectives such as health is a good goal.  However, as discussed above in 
the previous part of this paper, the countries do not agree on what constitutes a "higher level of 
protection."  What is both legal and uncontroversial in the United States may be vilified and 
troublesome in Canada or Mexico.
177  Put differently, one country's "higher level of protection" 
is considered superfluous or even an inferior protection in another.   
  In Article 906, the drafters tried to limit the anti-harmonization loopholes they had 
created in the Chapter's earlier Articles.  The Article contains instructions for the Parties to 
"work jointly to enhance the level of safety and protection [in the countries]."
178  It also 
commands that, " . . . taking into account international standardization activities, the Parties 
shall, to the greatest extent practicable, make compatible their respective standards-related 
measures, so as to facilitate trade in a good or service between the Parties."
179  Finally, it asks 
that Parties, "seek, through appropriate measures, to promote the compatibility of a specific 
standard  . . . that is maintained in its territory with the standards . . . maintained in the territory 
of the other Party."
180   
Taken together, these sections convey the sense that the drafters of the Agreement were 
well aware that it would take collective action and mutual compromise for the SRMs to avoid 
being unnecessary barriers to trade.  Though Article 906 is effective in tone, in practice it seems 
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more aspirational.  For instance, with regards to compatibility of different SRMs, once a country 
has determined that its citizens and consumers will only be protected by nutrition labels with text 
X millimeters high, any text which is not big enough is, by definition, a weaker protection.  The 
regulatory authorities of that country then face a choice: Either (A) they enforce their own 
standard claiming that it is a higher level of protection and therefore incompatible with the other 
country's, or (B) accept that their standard is unnecessarily strict and permit for "lesser" 
protection in the form of smaller lettering.   
The first option supports the claim that the existing regulations are both indispensable 
and perfectly tuned.  It allows for no compatibility, no harmonization.  The second option is 
tantamount to abandonment of a country's stricter ("more highly protective) standard in favor of 
adoption of the least stringent standard among the Parties.  What is more, if a country accepts the 
second option and allows for a less-stringent regulation to be enforced, the acquiescing Party 
would tacitly admit that, theretofore, they had been violating NAFTA Article  904 (4) (b).
181  
The selection of the second option, that which admits guilt and sacrifices a country's own 
regulation in favor of a foreign standard, seems highly unlikely.  Rather than promote 
cooperation and compatibility, Article 906 seems to reinforce how difficult harmonization will 
be under the current text of the NAFTA.    
Chapter Nine of the NAFTA contains contradictions throughout, being at times 
productive, counter-productive, and even unrealistic.  It makes many overtures to harmonization 
of the three Parties' regulations.  However, in every instance, it subsequently eviscerates any 
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harmony-forcing provisions.  Thu, it appears that in its current form, the NAFTA will not result 
in harmonized regulations.   
 
VI: POSSIBILITIES FOR HARMONIZATION 
  Is harmonization even possible?  The preceding pages have highlighted policy 
differences, political obstacles, historical hangovers and sometimes inexplicable ways that the 
three Parties in NAFTA have found to avoid a truly unencumbered market.  Either NAFTA must 
be renegotiated to make it less available to interpretation, or the countries must amend their 
regulations in concert (while also interpreting NAFTA identically).  Those are both tall orders.  
However, the harmonization of standards is not a pipe dream. 
Possibilities For Harmonization 
  The most important ingredients for the improved harmonization of regulations would be 
political will, sound logic, and humility.  No measures will be taken towards harmonization 
without the politicians willing it so.  In each country, there are massive incentives for politicians 
to avoid looking like they support free trade and harmonization of regulations.  The recent 
presidential elections in Mexico
182and the United States
183provide an example.  Any politician 
can receive a cheer from the crowd when they tell their audience that "we" will lose out to 
"them" in the presence of truly free trade.  Conversely, expository lectures on the theories of 
Adam Smith and David Ricardo do not make for scintillating stump speeches.  
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However, as world leaders meet to try to resolve the current economic crisis, the 
watchword is collective action.  The recent re-acknowledgement that a rising tide lifts all ships 
(and its converse) has forced policy makers to embrace collaboration.  People now want results, 
not rhetoric.  The recent public debate over protectionist language in the 2009 American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act
184 (more popularly known as the "stimulus bill") provides some 
hope.   
At first, many people sought to over-simplify the debate over free trade and say that 
America needed protectionism. Indeed, some protectionist language did make its way into the 
bill.
185   However, the President had to use the bully pulpit to explain to people that 
protectionism in one country could spark retaliatory measures from other countries, leaving 
everybody worse off.  The result was that Congress inserted language which effectively 
eviscerated the protectionist provision.
186  In this instance, the political decision to risk political 
capital and present an explanation of cause-and-effect had a significant impact upon the public's 
perception and ultimate policy decision.   
  The second ingredient, sound logic, relates not only to the public debate, but to the 
regulators themselves.  Certain aspects which initially appear intractable may be simpler than 
anticipated.  For instance, language is not an immovable object.  If a label is written in the 
"wrong" language for the location (say, a French/English label in Guadalajara), perhaps the 
retailer could be required to place a Spanish-language label on the vending display—next to the 
price.  Yes, it would shift the burden onto the vendor, but it might be better-placed there.  A 
vendor could make the translation once, instead of making the producer do it constantly.   
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Or, perhaps, sometimes languages can be mutually intelligible if the Latin root is used—
though it might take a slight readjustment.  If one considers the nutritional facts table, "fat" could 
be changed to, "lip." an abbreviation for "lipids."  That abbreviation could work across all three 
languages: "lipids," "lipides," (French) and "lípidos" (Spanish).  Creative, but not-so-complicated 
thinking is what is needed.
187   
  Other issues might require some common-sense and or compromise.  Do consumers in 
America really have superior information on the trans fat/saturated fat content than 
Canadians?
188  It strains logic to think that there is a significant population in the U.S. who must 
know the breakdown of trans versus saturated fat in their food (as opposed to knowing the sum 
like in Canada).  Furthermore, would Mexican industry really be put to such a disadvantage if 
they had to find out the nutritional values of all of their food?  Claims that they would be 
crippled would have to overcome the fact that in America and Canada, producers didn't go 
bankrupt en masse, and food continued to be sold even after people knew what their food's 
nutritive value was.  The list of possible but not radical compromises could take up many 
volumes of text.  The key, though, is that regulatory do not become wedded to their previous 
policies, and rather make the decision to find common ground. 
  And finally, the third ingredient of humility is both necessary and achievable.  Disease 
claims are limited in America, more limited in Canada, and banned in Mexico.  These 
regulations have all been taken by the regulatory agencies, after their respective legislatures 
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sanctioned them subject to scientific approval.  It would seem that the problem in this instance is 
that American scientists are very confident in their abilities, scientists in Canada think the 
Americans are too cavalier, and scientists in Mexico think they are all too crazy.  Either that, or 
regulators in one country think the science in another country is less than authoritative.   
Perhaps an international council of eminent scientists—all of whom respecting that the 
scientific process is an international language unto itself—could be formed that would deliver 
authoritative pronouncements in one voice.
189  Scientific advancement has long depended upon 
spirited and intelligent debate among colleagues.  There seems no reason for governments to turn 
away from the possible benefits of scientific debate.  If the scientists could come to a collective 
agreement, harmonization would then fall to the regulators to decide whether they wanted to 
accept or reject the scientific justifications for a policy.  This final point—agreement among 
scientists—would be crucial for the purpose of overcoming countries' current use of NAFTA 
Article 905 (which demands that SRMs be based upon scientific evidence) to avoid 
harmonization of regulation.   
The possibilities for harmonization require less of a miracle than an intelligent and 
methodical approach to the problem.  If leaders can help educate public, the public can help 
direct the politicians, and politicians can provide a space for regulators to make scientific and 
logic-based decisions, there are real opportunities ahead.    
The European Union: A Blueprint 
  Europe is an example of the possible benefits.  Those nations have longer historical 
obstacles, and more participating parties, yet they have achieved a remarkably open market.  
                                                 
189 In the United States, the National Academy of Sciences performs such an advisory role.  See: 
http://www.nationalacademies.org/about/  47 
 
From the consolidation of the modern European states in the 1500s to 1945, Europe was never 
more than a few years away from a war between major powers.  Britain versus Spain, France 
versus Germany (Prussia), Italy versus Austria, the permutations of adversaries are as 
interchangeable as Lego blocks.  Nationalism in Europe often takes on local flavor un-known in 
the New World
190 and the idea of a unified continent in 1945 would have been laughable.  Yet, 
with the 1999 introduction of the Euro, the European Union (EU), achieved what can only be 
called the greatest victory of free markets since the United States' constitutional convention 
decided to include the commerce clause.   
  But the EU as we know it did not spring from whole cloth in 1999, or 2002 when the 
Euro currency became "real" money.  Rather, the EU was born of nearly 50 years of negotiations 
and wrangling.  It began with the Treaties of Rome and the 1957 establishment of the European 
Economic Community.
191  What began as six countries trading steel and coal, grew steadily to 
other industries and nations.   
Countries which had been at war less than a generation earlier were now working 
together for their common economic benefit.  While everyone (both in the 1950s and 2000s) 
would admit that Europeans tend to harbor intra-continental stereotypes and even mistrust, they 
also realize that cooperation is the key to prosperity.  A 1998 pamphlet published by the 
European Commission's General Publications sets forth the mindset necessary to transcend the 
nationalistic tendencies which impede free trade:  
All [European] governments, regardless of political complexion, now recognise [sic] that the era 
of absolute national sovereignty is gone. Only by joining forces and working towards a "destiny 
                                                 
190 This theory can be tested by calling a Catalonian "Spanish," a Neapolitan, "Italian," or calling some Greek-
Macedonians merely ―Greek.‖    
191 The EEC itself was a continuance of the work begun in 1951 by the Treaty of Paris, which established the 
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henceforward shared," to quote the ECSC Treaty, can Europe's old nations continue to enjoy 
economic and social progress and maintain their influence in the world.
192   
 
Perhaps an end to "absolute national sovereignty" is unlikely in the U.S., Canada, and 
Mexico.  However, the three nations do not need to replicate the entirety of the EU's model in 
order to harmonize regulations.
193  The harmonization of regulatory standards would be a major 
step forward in a long process.  Indeed, Europe needed nearly 50 years of negotiation to arrive at 
a basically unified market, so North America should not be expected to accomplish the same feat 
after only 15 years.   
  North America now finds itself in a stage roughly analogous to what Europe faced in the 
late Twentieth Century.
194  The establishment of a free trade area comes as a process, and not as 
a single seismic event.  As free-traders' attention has shifted from tariffs to regulatory hurdles, 
the elimination of technical barriers to trade is but another step in the process.  If that process 
results in some loss of "sovereignty" over regulation of food labels, there would still be nearly-
infinite issues left for countries to assert sovereignty. 
 
VII: CONCLUSION 
  By entering into the NAFTA, the governments of the United States, Mexico and Canada 
made clear their desire to achieve a free trade area that would stretch from the Yucatán Peninsula 
to the Arctic Ocean.  However lofty those ambitions, they are not impossible.  Free trade can 
occur if the countries make the commitment to address each barrier to trade in turn.  The first 
                                                 
192 Pascal Fontaine, Europe in Ten Points, (1998).  Available online at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/publications/booklets/eu_glance/12/txt_en.htm (last visited on 3-28-09).  
193 For instance, the EU allows for the free movement of nationals between the member states and has a common 
currency.  These elements might aid in lowering transaction costs, but they are not the only elements of free trade. 
194 Taylor W. French, Free Trade and Illegal Drugs: Will NAFTA Transform the United States into the 
Netherlands?, 38 VNJTL 501, 538 (2005).   49 
 
hurdles—tariffs—were effectively eliminated by the treaty as applied.  Now, the three countries 
find themselves at the next hurdle—the harmonization of regulations which create technical 
barriers to trade. 
  Food labeling is but a single example of the many barriers that can exist.  As the 
regulations show, neither NAFTA nor similar thinking between legislatures on broad principles 
are enough to force detailed uniformity among regulatory bodies.  Differences can be at times 
tiny (the difference in rounding of fat content between American and Canadian labels), and at 
times large (the blanket Mexican ban on disease claims versus the American and Canadian 
methods of approval).  That uniformity will only come through explicit commands from the 
legislatures. 
  Such commands will require bravery on the part of legislatures.  In over 200 years of 
sharing this continent, the three Parties to NAFTA have crafted dynamics which may stand in the 
way of dispassionate policy making.  The pride and prejudices of the respective populations can 
be enough to frustrate any efforts at harmonization.  Fears of cession of sovereignty, loss of 
cultural identity, and diminution of safety protections are all valid concerns which must be 
addressed. 
  Despite seemingly high odds, greater cooperation is possible.  Europe had longer and 
sharper divisions to overcome before reaching its current level of harmonization.  If Europe can 
transcend centuries of conflict North American can overcome its own grudges.   
  The harmonization of food labeling standards in North America is an achievable goal, 
and policy makers in Mexico, Canada and the United States would benefit both consumers and 
industry to take up the mantle.   